Around the world, there are several governmental attempts, by means of new information -and communication technologies (ICTs) -to regenerate the relationship between citizen/business and governments. This article explores the Swedish electronic government reform attempts of transforming functionally specialized governmental agencies into a more coherent and integrated network administration -the so-called '24/7 Agency'. Based on a theoretical point of departure in the governance network literature, and Kingdon's different streams of problems, solutions and politics, the article investigates the twisting ways of fulfilling the vision of the reform-makers. The conclusion is that the institutional structures, in this case the Swedish model of government organization with independently managed under performance management, in many respects encumber the reform per se. In addition, the article concludes that theoretically there are many reasons to include national institutional settings in the study of governance networks in future research. Methodologically, the article is based on an interpretative policy analysis where data has been derived through interviews with central policy makers and studies of policy documents.
Introduction
The ongoing process of initiating and implementing electronic government (egovernment) strategies across the world has been widely studied from all sorts of disciplines, including information systems, organizational behaviour and public administration (for a review of the literature, see Gil-Garcia and Pardo, 2005) . However, what seems to be missing in the growing literature on e-government is a more critical stance on the institutional structures for the reform initiatives and the underlying setting of governance. Although there is no lack of literature on different national governments and international organizations' visions and strategies (cf. Grönlund, 2002) , the mainstream e-government literature rarely goes beyond basic descriptions of the policy ideas and the actors behind them. The bargaining and negotiations between policy actors (both inside and outside the government), which initiate the policy, set the agenda, as well as actually implement the policy, has been notably overlooked in the literature of e-government (with some exceptions, for example Acaud and Lakel, 2003; Bellamy, 2000; Pratchett, 1999) . Unless one includes the centrality of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for policy making in general (Margetts, 1998) , there is a tendency towards 'policy issues' in the literature becoming synonymous with formal and regulatory constraints such as, for example, legal issues regarding privacy, security and authenticity, or with financial constraints. Consequently, the success, or failure, of current reforms are explained through single government's 'e-government maturity' usually based on rather simple benchmarking exercises, where the benchmarks are derived from technological aspects thus leaving out the certain national institutional settings (Janssen et al., 2004) .
This article examines the reform process of the Swedish government's attempts to modernize the civil service through the means of new ICTs under the overall notion of the '24/7 Agency'. Sweden has, in several international benchmarking studies (cf. Accenture, 2006; United Nations, 2004) , been extolled as one of the front-runners in terms of e-government 'maturity'. One of the reasons for this policy success is claimed to be the so-called Swedish 'dualist model' of civil service, where the different governmental agencies, unlike many other European governments, are independently managed under performance management, and hold a considerable high level of autonomy vis-a-vis the Government. This administrative model, which dates back to the formation of the Swedish central governmental organization in the 17th century, provides the government agencies with pretty much free scope to complete the Government's general aims within the limits of some overarching instructions, accompanied by a negotiated budget from the Cabinet.
My point of departure is that the Swedish success story of electronic government is subject to discussion, and that an analysis of the underlying governance structure will demonstrate the significance of the institutional national settings for the success or failure of e-government reforms. The theoretical approach in this article, presented in section two, is deduced from a governance network perspective to policy making. In addition to the governance perspective, this section will also discuss the decision-making aspects based on John W. Kingdon's work on multiple streams of agenda setting (Kingdon, 1984 (Kingdon, /2003 as well as network implementation approach (Exworthy and Powell, 2004 ). Kingdon's streams will also function as the guiding tool for the different subsections in the empirical section. The following part of the article will briefly analyse the agenda-setting process of the central government's initiatives vis-a-vis their agencies, and through this, cast some light on the agenda-setting phase in a governance perspective. In the final part of that section I will contrast the ambitions with the actual outcome of the reform attempts, and the importance of the already existing institutional structures. The last concluding section will discuss some of the problems network governance faces, vis-a-vis already existing institutional structures.
In terms of research methods, this article is influenced by Yanow (2000) and her methodology of interpretive policy analysis. By identifying the various meanings carried by the language, as expressed in the policy documents and perceived by 'policy stakeholders', we are made capable to move behind the face-value understanding of the Swedish e-government vision, and become enabled to observe how different categories around the policy process are created. In this perspective Kingdon's streams also give us a guiding tool to identify three important points of departures of the categories involved in the policy process. Here the 'politics' of the reform, which here become the institutional settings, show out to be the decisive stream. The empirical work is based on studies of official policy documents including governmental bills, commission reports and internal reports from the actors. In addition, a number of semi-structured elite interviews with policy makers were carried out. These interviews are derived from a major research project on Swedish ICT-policy sponsored by the Swedish Research Council in 2002-5 in which a total of 36 elite actors on a central level were interviewed. For the purpose of this article I have used 10 interviews, including actors from the following institutions: the '24/7 Commission' (the principal secretary and one of the board members); The ICT-strategy Group (the principal secretary); the Swedish Agency for Public Management (the general director, and two senior officers from the unit for electronic government); the Office of Administrative Development in the Ministry of Finance (the head of unit for the division); the ICT-policy group of the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications (the principal secretary); the Government Interoperability Board (the head of the board); and the Swedish Trade Association of the ICT-industry (the acting chairman of the board).
Studying E-government Policy from a Governance Perspective
There has, since the mid-1990s, among scholars in political science and public administration, been a growing attention to new modes of governance, based on self-governing networks, which deviate from the classical dichotomous categories of hierarchy and market. For some scholars, this has been explained by major changing political and societal conditions for governing throughout the world (cf. Castells, 1996) . Others have pointed out that this should rather be conceived as a new epistemological focus different from the traditional, and more functionalist, understanding of politics and policy making (Jessop, 2003; Rhodes, 2000) . Whereas the concept of governance depicts many different, and mutually contradictory, definitions and understandings of political changes (Pierre, 2000: 3; Rhodes, 1997) , there seems to be a basic agreement that policy networks within and outside the government have become increasingly imperative in policy making. I will neither review here the rich variety of definitions of governance, nor seek to contribute to identifying the final word on governance, but will merely use some of the underpinning concepts for framing this article.
First, the whole notion of governance involves a keystone idea of a dislocation of the traditional hierarchical ('stovepipe') concept of governing with a strong and unitary state at the centre of the polity. Although the abandoned concept of government, usually in the governance literature, is conceived as an ideal-model there is a general notion that current modes of governing are far from the traditional state-centred mode of governing. In terms of this article, the government is still very much at the centre of the policy process in its capacity of being the single actor holding legitimate authority to make and enforce binding decisions across a wide range of societal actors, and equally, hold a central ability to gather and process information (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 46) . The government's capacity is, however, restricted to a 'meta-governing' role that involves: the design of institutions and generation of visions which can facilitate not only selforganisation in different fields, but also the relative coherence of the diverse objectives, spatial and temporal horizons, actions, and outcomes of various self-organising arrangements. (Jessop, 1998: 42) The policy networks analysed in this article are directly initiated and facilitated by the government, but the government does not represent a sovereign source of authority. Moreover, what makes the Swedish case special, is that it by no means is solely the result of network governance, but is part of the institutional settings. A certain path-dependency (Pierson, 2000) , embedded in the Swedish dualist model mentioned earlier, endows at least the governmental agencies with an exclusive powerbase based on their historically given autonomy, which in turn excludes pure state-centred modes of governing, and creates power dependence between the Cabinet offices and the agencies.
Second, within the governance perspective there is a tendency for the classical linear model of policy making to become less structured and discrete. In contrast to the classical 'policy stage model' (cf. Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) , some authors within the governance perspective emphasize how the boundary between policy (agenda-setting) and implementation becomes more fluid, and is open for feedback and learning during the policy cycle (Newman, 2001: 35) . In practice, this means that policy visions, ideas and solutions are flexible, and constantly open to reinterpretation even after the agenda-setting stage. In the absence of a visible central authority, and formalized and regulated structures for decision-making, the network(s) of the governance model is (are) left to themselves to identify the ways of handling negotiations and bargaining. This leaves the floor open for renegotiating the policy solutions. In Swedish e-government policy, the blurring of the linear model can be witnessed through the work of the policy networks and through the lack of a clear chain of command. Rather than a clear division between central decision makers and implementing agents, we can see how the policy stakeholders, who are supposed to implement the policy, are 'invited' to take part through networks initiated by the government. But equally, these networks never make any unambiguous decisions, but relocate the responsibility back to stakeholders to fill out the details. Consequently, it is difficult, not to say impossible, to identify the actual policy decision, which in the case of Swedish e-government policy seems to be subject to endless reinterpretation among the actors involved.
Third, in terms of rationality, and also in addition to what has just been said, the governance approach also presupposes that policy processes are complex and fluid and by no means follow any rational logic (cf. Pierre and Peters, 2005) . Hence, the approach bears resemblance to the 'garbage can' model of decisionmaking (Cohen et al., 1972) , which states that rather than trying to resolve problems, organizations (and decision makers) have preferred policies and are constantly looking for opportunities to implement them. As such, problem-solving is a complex, and often a random, combination of problems and solutions, and the chance that a particular policy proposal becomes a success has as much to do with chance as with meticulous analysis. Based on this garbage-can theory John Kingdon later developed an altered version in which policy agenda change is the product of the confluence of three otherwise independent 'streams' that flow under policy processes (Kingdon, 1984 (Kingdon, /2003 . First, there are 'problem streams' in which different indicators, pushed by certain events, crises and symbols, draw the attention of the decision-makers to the fact that there exists a problem that needs to be appreciated and resolved. Second, there are 'policies streams' in which ideas, visions and proposals are formulated, subjected to criticism and revision and reformulation, by those actors who are constantly engaged within the policy area. Finally, Kingdon talks about a 'politics stream', which roughly speaking can be defined as the 'the political state of the nation' (for example election results, change, 'the general national mood' and pressure group campaigns, etc.). Now and again these three streams converge, and subsequently there is an opportunity for change in the policy agenda, occasions that Kingdon (1984 Kingdon ( /2003 has coined 'policy windows'. The most dedicated actors, the so-called 'policy entrepreneurs', play a vital role in conflating the streams, and putting them on the decision-makers' agenda. Although it is important to analyse the three streams separately, it is the convergence that creates change. It should be mentioned that Kingdon's framework for understanding agenda-setting has been criticized. Among other things, some authors have pointed out the difficulties of falsifying the results given his 'fluid framework', and also the problems of generating hypotheses (cf. Heimer and Stinchcombe, 1999; Sabatier, 1999) . From my perspective though, this criticism is derived from an ideal of creating a universal theory in policy studies, which I find it hard to subscribe to. However, a more serious criticism of Kingdon, which he himself acknowledges in the second edition of his work (Kingdon, 2003: 229ff.) , is that institutions constitute serious constraints to agenda-setting. Whether the institutions work against, or in favour of, a certain policy proposal is in this perspective an empirical issue. This is something we will return to later in the final section.
This perspective of including the garbage can model in the governance approach is also viable for the study of the outcome of the process (i.e. the result of the implementation). Exworthy and Powell (2004) present a theoretical framework, partly based on the work by Kingdon mentioned earlier, in which they claim that a successful implementation not only requires clear policy objectives, feasible mechanisms and adequate resources, but also a wider understanding of the 'spatial domains' of implementation. In a governance context, both policy initiation as well as policy implementation reside at multiple sites and between actors that are mutually dependent upon each other both vertically and horizontally. Equally as important for successful implementation as spatial interdependence are the policy streams and the convergence of streams. Another aspect of network implementation can be deduced from Bressers and O'Toole (1998) who juxtapose the character of a policy network with the selection of policy instruments. Their central argument is that the choice of policy instruments in a network context is dependent on whether the policy instrument's characteristics help to maintain the existing characteristics of the network (Bressers and O'Toole, 1998: 225) . The two basic characteristics in terms of the network, which are dependent variables here, are first the degree of cohesion within the network, and second the interconnectedness between the actors.
Problems, Policies, Politics and Outcomes of the Swedish E-government Strategy
The current reform initiative on transforming Swedish public agencies to network agencies under the overarching catchphrase '24/7 Agency', is the last in a line of previous reform initiatives which since the early 1960s have had the goal, by means of computers and ICTs, to modernize central public administration, and to make it more efficient and rational and to enhance the access to, and delivery of, government services. Electronic government has been a founding cornerstone of the overall national Swedish ICT-policy since the early 1990s (Hall and Löfgren, 2004) . The idea of a 24/7 Agency first turns up in a governmental bill on administrative reform: Central Government Administration in the Citizens' Service (Govt. Bill 1997/98: 136) . This bill, however, did not include any concrete measures (or policy instruments), but merely stressed the importance of exploiting new ICTs in the work of modernizing government administration. The vision embedded in this new concept was to emphasize something new, and different, beyond the traditional work of making internal work processes in the Government and the agencies more efficient. Following this bill on a more service-oriented public administration, the Government in December 1999 decided to commission the Swedish Agency for Public Management [Statskontoret] (SAFAD) to draw up criteria for the proposed basis for the concept of 24-hour, seven-days-a-week public sector agencies. In May 2000 SAFAD released a first report -The 24/7 Agency: Criteria for 24/7 Agencies in the Networked Public Administration (SAFAD, 2000) -with the aim of defining criteria concerning the concept of 24/7. A central feature of the report is a general list of benchmarks ('a development stairway'). The purpose of these benchmarks it to measure the development of interactivity and level of network capabilities in terms of websites within individual agencies of the government whereas the final step is fully electronically integrated agencies. This goal is also repeated in the last governmental bill From ICT-policy to Policy for the Information Society (Govt. Bill 2004/05: 175) . But the ambitions do not really stop there; some of the more subtle, and underlying, ambitions are explicitly stressed by SAFAD at a relatively early stage:
The vision is a development towards a public administration where government authorities, local and regional governments, collaborate in networks in order to fulfil their duties, and where citizens and business hold a centre position. The Swedish Agency for Public Management puts forward that this development can be encapsulated in the concept of the citizen and business oriented network agency. (SAFAD, 2003: 8, author's translation, emphasis in original) As such, the final goal is more than just endowing central agencies with electronic networks; it is actually to tear down existing administrative walls between different organizations and reinvent central administration in the shape of a network organization.
The Problems
One perhaps obvious question that arises from the 24/7 Agency policy, like with all other policy issues, is what sort of problems the policy is supposed to solve. Even though the problems are not easily identifiable, one can find some common problems in most of the policy documents that have been published since the launch of the policy in 1999. Most of these are repeated in the preambles of various governmental commission reports, internal agency reports, and guidelines for local agency managers. Equally, many of these publications make crossreferences to each other as well. First, a problem brought up in many of the policy reports, and where the policy behind the 24/7 Agency is considered to be a solution, is the problem of public information and services not being accessible (cf. SAFAD, 2002 (cf. SAFAD, : 9, 2003 . This problem encompasses two sides, which are not completely complementary. On the one hand, there is a rather dominant idea that increasing mobility in Sweden combined with internationalization of business and more 'complex needs' requires a modern public administration that can develop the country's industry and competitiveness and provide good service for the citizens, and thus the foundation of the modern welfare state. This is, for example, mentioned in the Governmental Bill, An Information Society for All, in 2000 where it was said that:
. . . effective dissemination of information is a highly significant means of raising efficiency in public administration itself. Making basic information from the public information available is another factor with a bearing on growth and welfare. (Govt. Bill 1999 This is also repeated in, for example the terms of reference for the so-called 24/7 Delegation (Dir. 2003: 81) where it is stated that: the industry's competitiveness becomes increasingly dependent upon dynamic environments with a well-functioning infrastructure, including access to public information sources which can be recycled and refined in a market. (The Government, 2003: 1) In terms of the 24/7 Agency, this, only to a minor extent, entails the old discussion on public access to the infrastructure, that is, the so-called 'digital divide'. Instead, the problem is the lack of integrated electronic public services. The related, but yet different problem, which the lack of accessibility is supposed to cause, is the decrease in political participation through normal representative avenues. The 24/7 Agency is here supposed to enhance democracy, and in particular, transparency and participation. Interestingly, this problem is mainly mentioned in the major commission reports and in the preludes to the governmental bills. In terms of the internal agency reports from SAFAD, these problems seem to be of less importance.
Second, one of the major policy problems preceding the 24/7 Agency policy proposals is the more or less continuation of the older goals to rationalize public services. It should be noted that the presentation of the problem, i.e. the rationalization of public services, should not only be a benefit to the internal work organization of an individual agency, but should also be cost-saving for the citizen/customer and industry. This assumption is somehow taken for granted as stated in the above mentioned Bill (Govt. Bill 1999 where it is stated:
The development of information technology means that virtually all public-sector information will be electronically produced, stored and distributed, to rationalise public services. The specific costs of compiling information and delivering it to citizens and companies will, in this situation, be low. (Govt. Bill 1999 Related to the problems mentioned earlier, the later reports (i.e. those dating from 2000 and onwards) have all identified the problems of changing demography with an increasing number of senior citizens outside the labour market (and consequently a reduced workforce), and the subsequent need to rationalize and revitalize the public sector (24/7 Delegation, 2004) . These two problems more or less correspond to some extent with a less formal, and personal, description by a senior civil servant in SAFAD who has been responsible for the development of many of the action plans for the 24/7 Agency:
There are three reasons why the politicians are concerned about public administration. The first one is when they get frightened because the administration is running astray, you receive warning signals from troublesome researchers, and the situation gets out of control . . . This was what happened in the 1970s with the huge [governmental] commissions on the civil service. The public administration becomes too big and complex and they ask themselves: how in hell can we govern this? The second reason is that we run out of money. That's what happened in the 80s and the 90s. The third reason is the feeling that the citizens' trust in public administration is deteriorating. And that's exactly what happened here in the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century.
The third problem, which only to a limited extent is revealed in the policy documents, is the aftermath of the so-called 'dotcom crisis' in 2000 where a fast growing Swedish software industry suddenly found themselves in a deep financial crisis and a loss of interest from private venture capital. Consequently, the ICT industry turned to the government with the hope that there would be a market for their products in the public sector. Based on interviews with representatives from both the industry, as well as public officials, I have learnt that the trade association of the Swedish ICT industry had had some success in lobbying for the introduction of compulsory ICT strategies in all governmental agencies, and subsequently, certain audit requirements in the reports to the respective ministries. The idea behind this was that by forcing the agencies to report their progress on integrating ICTs in their operation, they would be forced to procure more systems and services from the ICT industry.
The final problems, if it can be labelled a problem, are the indicators. Many of the reports, as well as the interview respondents, make references to the international benchmark studies in which Sweden usually is at the top of the list. As it is described in the reference of terms for the 24/7 Delegation:
It is vital for Sweden to consolidate its position as an outstanding ICT nation and, through a forward-looking policy, achieve even higher positions. This is important to the business sector's development and competitiveness, and to people's quality of life and participation in social development. In addition, it helps to bolster Sweden's reputation and role in international cooperation. (The Government, 2003) During the interviews with senior officials involved in the policy-making process, this was presented as the key problem. However, why it is imperative for Sweden is actually not really elaborated, and as the quote here signals, it is barely underpinned by any rational logic:
Are we not all affected by competitions? Journalists for example love these sorts of competitions. Even though nobody sincerely cares who wins, you still feel proud when your own country wins the Eurovision song contest even though you can't imagine something more pointless. [Interview with the head of the Government Interoperability Board] Compared to Kingdon's examples of more 'sudden problems' that have triggered the identification of problems, the problems embedded in the 24/7 Agency policy are of a different nature. Adopting the language of crisis and disaster management (McConnell, 2003: 393) we can conclude these problems are 'chronic' and subsequently harder to mobilize any interest for. However, the policy problem category not only includes crisis, but also 'events' and 'symbols'. Concerning the use of symbols, there is all reason to believe that modern ICTs represent a strong symbol for modernization and revitalizing of Swedish society, and subsequently, the public administration (Hall and Löfgren, 2004) .
The Policies
Kingdon stresses that every policy area is encompassed by a more, or less, fragmented policy community, composed of various specialists such as researchers, civil servants, consultants, etc. with some sort of regular interaction. He is not very precise about the actual nature of these networks and a better distinction can be found in Marsh (1998) , who makes a distinction between the tightly integrated 'policy communities' and the more fragmented and ad hoc based 'issue networks' (Marsh, 1998: 16) . In terms of this study, it makes more sense to talk about a policy community as we are talking about a limited number of stable participants that are mutually interdependent upon each other. Moreover, this community is completely dominated by professionals, and there is a high stability in exchange, values and outcomes. Although it is difficult to get the full picture of this policy community circling around the 24/7 Agency policy, it is still possible to identify a rather stable group of actors who are involved in the work. First and foremost a key player in the policy community is the Swedish Agency for Public Management (SAFAD). The agency has been assigned a formal coordinating role through a number of commissions from the government, as well as supporting assignments in terms of establishing public procurement and technical recommendations. Second, we have the responsible ministry -The Ministry of Finance -where the Division for Administrative Development represents the more 'political' impetus to the development of the policy. Their role though, is quite limited, as much of the policy drafting is delegated to SAFAD. They do not carry out any operative work themselves: there is a rather understaffed group that works with these issues in the department. Third, there is a group of major governmental agencies -'The Big Five' -that works with either taxes or welfare benefits. They were all involved in the special network 'the Governmental e-forum', which was a consultative body. Their views were especially important for the establishment of the special 'Government Interoperability Board' in 2004 with the mandate to establish common standards and guidelines for electronic information exchange within government, in particular concerning security and accessibility issues. Needless to say, these agencies are those who have the funds to invest money in new information systems and business solutions: Fourth, another important actor is the industry, primarily represented through its trade association which, as mentioned above, for a long time has advocated that the government should act as a spearhead in developing new on-line services. Although not as visible in the more formal realms of the policy as the public sector actors, the industry is represented in some of the 'networks', and is an important actor in the regular discussions on public procurement. In addition to these major players, there is a rather mixed group of academics, consultants and representatives from different minor agencies and trade associations that are involved in the policy making processes. The parliament and most of the political leadership of the government are, in this context, rather excluded from participation, a state which at least the civil servants are not too remorseful about:
Well, you can say that this is not 'party politics' which we are quite content about as it provides us with continuity in our work. [Interview with the Division Head in the Ministry of Finance] In relation to the discussion above on the characteristics of policy networks, and the subsequent policy instruments, the network of actors around Swedish egovernment policy is characterized by weak cohesion, but strong interconnectedness. In practice this means that the actors are less governable, that the network is maintained by commitments set in multilateral agreements, which are normative appealing, and that the main actor (in this case SAFAD) supervises compliance with the commitments. The policy instruments then become less coercive and based on information dissemination and reporting (audit) requirements.
Regarding the current Swedish 24/7 policy, the actual policy solutions have been underway for a long period. A couple of overarching ideas seem to have manifested in so far as they are now natural components in policy documents, as well as in responses from my interviews. First, that despite the Government's overall democratic ambitions to revitalize public administration, much of the language of the policy can be said to rest on a consumerist, and service oriented, perception of public management. A perception that to some extent mirrors the global trend of 'New Public Management', although the Swedish case here, like elsewhere, is far from a blueprint of the original ideas (Pollit, 2001) . However, the comparison with the private sector is an essential ingredient in the policy documents:
Citizens are demanding more value for money. The rapid development of online banking and other online services make people press for public services to be delivered online as well and to demand the same standard of service from government as they do from the corporate sector. (Speech by responsible minister Gunnar Lund, 9 December 2003) Despite the rhetorical claim that the vision rests on a notion of a 'democratisation of public administration' including organizational change in favour of the citizens, the actual policy suggestions, by and large, refer to changes in information management in which technical problems, such as interoperability between different administrative units seem to be the main concern. Even though the initiation of the policy came with a commission report on the future of Swedish public administration, many of the policy documents signal that this is first and foremost a technical vision even if it is emphasized that e-government is no end in itself (SAFAD, 2004: 3) . Subsequently, many of the workgroups and network groups that have been initiated are mainly composed of persons with a technical background and competence. Second, it should be noted that the Swedish civil service model, for example independently managed agencies, working under a performance management regime, was the starting point for change. Having said that, there are traces of an underlying assumption that the Swedish model is facing 'challenges' from 'complex needs in society', as well as 'needs for more specialised and sophisticated skills ' (SAFAD, 2004: 2) . Although the model is considered to be 'flexible' there is a call for more compulsory solutions:
Nevertheless, there are situations in which a more general and compulsory solution is more suitable. This applies for example, to the provision of information resources since one of the political objectives is that a person or company should not need to submit the same information more than once. (SAFAD, 2004: 2) Third, and partly as a consequence of what has already been said in terms of the characteristics of the network, the policy solutions are limited to the overall work of eliminating legal obstacles, presenting guidelines and technical standards, facilitating support through different 'networks' and producing 'good examples' that can be replicated by others. The core idea is that the vision is supposed to disseminate throughout all ministries and agencies in central government. Good examples and the anticipation of reduced costs will be incentives enough for the other actors to take action themselves. As described by the former principal secretary of the 24/7 Agency Commission:
It's the force in the [individual] agency that matters really. Both for agencies and for local governments and we are far ahead [than other countries] really through this strategy. It has been really successful and we'll continue this. What really drives [the agency] is the good example which is appreciated as positive among those who are engaged.
In terms of output based on this 'light touch' approach, we can identify that most of the concrete initiatives have concentrated on different form of 'persuasive outputs' in shape of guidelines, pamphlets and websites. By spreading the word, it is anticipated that other actors will react.
The Politics
As already indicated, there seems to be a general disinterest by political parties in actually engaging with the 24/7 Agency, and there is every reason to believe that both issues concerning ICTs, as well as issues regarding the modernization of public administration, rank very low with the parties, and subsequently, that party politics is of less importance for the reform. Having said that, there is at least one event that had a fundamental impact on the policy development of the 24/7 Agency. The background was the previously mentioned general crisis of the software industry in 2000, when the general political interest in ICT-related policy issues dropped dramatically. This affected the political attention given to all issues involving ICTs (Hall and Löfgren, 2004) . Consequently, the shift in the organization of the overall ICT-policy in Sweden in 2003, when the government decided to close down the then central actor for coordination of the ICT-policy -the so-called 'ICT-Commission' -stayed an important event. The Ministry of Finance here seized the opportunity to set up their own body to deal with issues concerning electronic government. Electronic government had previously been a part of the general ICT-policy, and thus under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications (MIEC). The interviews with senior persons in both the Ministry of Finance and SAFAD reveal a general fatigue with the attempts to initiate and produce concrete policy within the province of the MIEC, which was at the time (and still formally is) responsible for Swedish ICT-policy. The main problem with the general ICTpolicy, mainly represented by the ICT-commission, was that it could not produce anything other than 'glittering ambitions and visions'.
Well, the ICT-commission comprised a sort of 'idle-talk-role' and [they] chatted away on a rather abstract level. They managed to talk themselves out of the policy as nobody could be bothered to listen to them. Some of the new commissions [e.g. the 24/7 Agency Commission] are much more focused on accomplishment as they have been commissioned to coordinate . . . The ICT-commission tried to get their mandate extended but nobody thought that their approach had worked. [Interview with senior civil official in SAFAD]
It would be wrong to say that the MIEC was happy to see one of the cornerstones of the overall ICT-policy being pulled away, and during the interviews with representatives of SAFAD (and also the Industry), there were indications that there was a tussle between the two different Ministries. In particular, since the MIEC decided to set up their own new body, the so-called 'IT-policy Strategy Group' (this time internally in the Ministry), with the mission to continuing developing a general interdepartmental Swedish ICT-policy based on concepts such as 'access', 'confidence' and 'trust'. Although the two different groups have met, and do inform each other about each others' activities, the interviews reveal some lack of confidence in organizing the policy through horizontal interdepartmental groups.
So what do they do? Well, they invent concepts such as 'trust' and similar ideas, and try to horizontally run over everybody who is engaged [in the policy field]. It becomes a bit awkward and really strained from our perspective. Consequently, the effect is that we let them work with it and pull out. Every ministry is supposed to work with these issues anyway, so we can just sit back and wait for the result. [Interview with the Head of Division in Ministry of Finance]
Fulfilling the Policy?
As already indicated above, the implementation of the vision of the 24/7 Agency has, only to a limited extent, been accompanied with coercive policy instruments such as legislation and financial subsidies. This is partly a result of the special Swedish administrative model, but might also be interpreted as a way of governing through networks in order to accomplish the policy goals. The underlying strategy is to apply a 'network implementation' model in which different actors work together towards a common goal, albeit the vision is initiated from above, and where the outcome ideally should be beneficial for all partners. This is something that resembles the analytical point of departure mentioned earlier, in Section 2 of this article. But as Exworthy and Powell indicate, this sort of implementation needs attention, and there is every reason to believe that in the case of the 24/7 Agency there have been problems with fulfilling the vision. In 2004, the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) presented a special audit report on the Government's control and steering of the 24/7 Agency work (SNAO, 2004) . The conclusion of the report was very critical to the ongoing process of meeting the policy the Government has set up. Partly this criticism is directed towards individual agencies and their lack of commitment to actually work with the e-government issues, but it is mainly a criticism of the Government's lack of control of the process. First, the report concludes that the ambition of actually reaching fully integrated network services across institutional borders has by no means been the driving force in the ongoing work with the 24/7 Agency. Rather than making investments in enhanced electronic services for citizens and business, most of the public agencies had made investments in information systems that increased effectiveness and efficiency of their back-office functions. Second, the development of new advanced electronic services had actually come to a halt in 2004 and there were few new examples that year. Third, the idea of establishing joint issue-based portals (for example portals on education, insurance) across institutional borders, and in accordance with more coherent public administration, was not considered to be a prioritized question among the governmental agencies.
However, the audit report also addresses the lack of instructions and support from the Government. SNAO had, in their report, asked a selected number of agencies in 2003 about what support they had received from their ministries. The answer was that none of the agencies felt that this was something that the ministries had prioritized at all, as well as there being no guidelines whatsoever. The agencies did not know what was expected of them in terms of implementing the visions, and they did not know the underpinning strategic considerations either. A few of the Ministries had worked out some general guidelines, but the implementation work was expected to take place in-house in the respective agencies. In the few cases where it had been mentioned in the appropriation directions in the budget allocation of resources of the 24/7 Agency, it was only mentioned casually with phrases such as: 'Agency X should work for the implementation of the 24/7 Agency'. The overall picture shows that the Ministries have let the issue pass on to the Agencies, including the question of what was expected of the actual producers of the new 24/7 Agency. Equally, the SNAO report also reveals that the knowledge about the ideas behind the 24/7 Agency was relatively low inside the Ministries, and few actually knew what was going on in the respective agencies.
The problem of lack of governmental control is also addressed by the government itself in their latest ICT-bill where it is considered to be the chief problem for fulfilling the vision (The Government, 2005) . Having said that, this bill signals a continuation of the previous policy instruments as it more or less advocates 'more-of-the-same' instruments as previously (i.e. enhancing the agencies' consensus about the aims, adjusting legislation and requiring evaluation reports from the agencies). But the criticism has been taken seriously by other parts of the government. Following a committee report on the internal organization of the government a proposal was passed by the government that decided to merge some of the actors, including those parts of SAFAD working with e-government; the Board of Interoperability and the 24/7 Agency Delegation (plus some others) in a new 'public administration agency' with an overall responsibility to work with the 24/7 Agency issue. The new authority for civil service development ('VERVA') commenced their work in 2006. Whether this will result in more coercive policy instruments it is still too early to say, but it will inevitably mean that some of the former detached actors will merge into a single actor in a purely organizational sense. This could also be read as a desertion of the network idea for organizing the e-government policy. Furthermore, it illustrates that the Swedish dualist model of independent managed agencies, even though bearing resemblances to the governance network model, is distinct from the new modes of network governance, and also still is very resistant to experiments with new modes of governance.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of this article has been to analyse the reform initiative of transforming central Government agencies with the means of new ICTs under the label 24/7 Agency from a network governance perspective in which the institutional settings seem to play an important role. The empirical findings in this article are probably not exclusive for the field of e-government, but can easily be transferred to other 'new' cross-departmental policy fields that are governed through networks. But equally, the findings also draw the attention to how the 'hierarchy', in this article manifested through the Swedish independently managed agencies, seems to be quite resistant against new modes of network governance. Just as the formation of networks can be a means to replace the absence of coercive policy instruments, it can just as well become an empty symbolic gesture; a 'dust bin' for issues nobody wants to touch. Moreover, there are signs that the rather blurred policy process in the case of the Swedish e-government reform, where the different problems and policy solutions are blended in a rather random way, makes the aims of the policy diffused to an extent that those in charge of the implementation are made incapable of understanding what they are supposed to accomplish. In this perspective the governance network literature should take into account more the different national institutional path-dependencies. The Swedish case, which, with its already existing prerequisites for network governance, in theory should reveal less resistant from the hierarchy, demonstrates the problems with fragmented forms of governance where the policy instruments are limited to 'dialogue' and 'governance by visions' (Hall, 2004) .
In terms of the empirical case of electronic government, there are reasons to believe that the Swedish case by no means is unique. The road to fulfilling the vision of a fully integrated networked public administration is in practice more complicated than the rational simple technical visions, and the international benchmarking exercise should, to some extent, take into account the national institutional differences.
